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2002).
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forth (Goodall, 2007).
Visual Analytics: a data analytical approach that combines interactive visualizations with
automatic analysis methods for a more comprehensive perception, reasoning and
decision making process when processing massive and complex datasets (Keim et
al., 2008).
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ABSTRACT

Wang, Weijie. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. A Characteristic-based Visual
Analytics Approach to Detect Subtle Attacks from NetFlow Records. Major Professor:
Baijian Yang.

Security is essentially important for any enterprise networks. Denial of service,
port scanning, and data exfiltration are among of the most common network intrusions.
It’s urgent for network administrators to detect such attacks effectively and efficiently
from network traffic. Though there are many intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and
approaches, Visual Analytics (VA) provides a human-friendly approach to detect
network intrusions with situational awareness functionality. Overview visualization is
the first and most important step in a VA approach. However, many VA systems cannot
effectively identify subtle attacks from massive traffic data because of the incapability of
overview visualizations. In this work, we developed two overviews and tried to identify
subtle attacks directly from these two overviews. Moreover, zoomed-in visualizations
were also provided for further investigation. The primary data source was NetFlow and
we evaluated the VA system with datasets from Mini Challenge 3 of VAST challenge
2013. Evaluation results indicated that the VA system can detect all the labeled
intrusions (denial of service, port scanning and data exfiltration) with very few false
alerts.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Presentlt, network systems and infrastructures are often enormous and complex,
and tens of hundreds of servers and hosts are working simultaneously. A mass of
network intrusions occur on a daily basis, trying to damage network service or
compromise servers to steal confidential data and information. Confidentiality, integrity
and availability are critical to any enterprise network infrastructures. Therefore,
monitoring the status of network system and detecting intrusions are among the
highest priorities of network administration and security analysts. Various approaches
and solutions have been proposed and studied for intrusion detection, such as
statistics-based, pattern-based, and rule-based (Liao et al., 2013).
Although numerous algorithms and systems have been studied and
implemented, humans are still critical part in the network security process. Visual
Analytics system has attracted attention from industry and academia because of its
significant involvement of human analysts. Simply speaking, Visual Analytics combines
interactive visualizations with automatic analysis methods for a more comprehensive
perception, reasoning and decision making process when we deal with massive and
complex datasets (Keim et al., 2008). Therefore, visual analysis of network data will help
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human analysts to analyze and explore the mass amount of datasets efficiently, as well
as to perceive patterns, trends, and exceptions. With the increasing size of computer
networks and continuous appearance of new types of attacks, the research on
visualization for network security is facing more and more challenges (Cook et al., 2012).
In a large scale of network, detecting “subtle” attacks from massive amount of network
traffic is difficult. Preprocessing, extracting, and analyzing the “big data” in visual
analytics systems and tools is still an open challenge.

1.1

Research Topic

The concept of information visualization has been proposed for more than 15
years. Formally, information visualization includes the use of computer-supported,
visual representations of data in order to enhance cognition with help of human
exceptional perceptual capabilities (Card, Mackinlay, &Shneiderman, 1999).
The basic idea of information visualization is to display the data in some visual
forms and representations, in order to understand the data, get insights into the data,
interact with the data directly and come to conclusions by human analysts. Moreover,
visual data techniques have proven to be an effective way in exploratory data analysis
and they also show high potential for exploring large volume of databases (Keim, 2002).
Information visualization has provided us a different perspective to explore data, the
aim of Visual Analytics is to facilitate our way of processing information and data
transparent for an investigative discourse. Visual Analytics is a step further than
information visualization. It can rather be treated as an integral method to data
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exploration and decision-making, combining information visualization techniques,
human factors and data analysis (Keim et al., 2008).
This research primarily focused on designing and implementing a visual analytics
system prototype to detect network intrusions, including port scanning, denial of service
attacks, and data exfiltration. The characteristics of these attacks are heavily
emphasized in the visual analytics, thus it is a characteristic-based approach. In
particular, detecting subtle attacks from the massive amount of network traffic and how
to extract the “right data” from “big data” are the primary interests.

1.2

Significance

Rapidly identifying and classifying malicious activities and intrusions through
network traffic is a major challenge for human analysts exacerbated by complexity of
data sets and functionally limited manual analysis tools. Even on a relatively small
enterprise network, manual processing and analyzing of traffic data is extremely time
consuming. Information visualization frees the human analysts from reading and
examining large volume of data logs. A well-designed visualization graph can potentially
summarize a week’s or even a month’s worth of network traffic and intrusion alerts,
helping human analysts unearth the intrusion events. Additionally, visualization tools
generally provide interactive components that facilitates human analyst to examine
detailed information of any suspicious activities (Itoh et al., 2006). Comparing to
statistics-based and pattern-based approaches, visual analytical approach is usually
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intuitive, meaning no significant requirement of complicated mathematical or statistical
knowledge (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 2012).
Although there are many benefits of visualization systems for detecting network
intrusions, developing a good analytical system and visualization tool is not an easy job
because of the growth of network, the complexity of network traffic and the various
types of network intrusions.
The first challenge is the massive amount and complexity of the network traffic
data. Camacho et al. (2014) pointed out that network monitoring for security shares a
number of features with other Big Data problems, the so-called 4 Vs: Variety, Veracity,
Volume and Velocity. Even though there have been numerous studies related to
visualization of intrusion detection systems, many of them have difficulties when
dealing with large-scale of network data (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 2012). In a
network with hundreds or even thousands of servers and hosts, large amount of normal
traffic data will cover the subtle attacks, which may use only a few traffic records,
making them extremely difficult to be detected by conventional visualization. Therefore,
this project tried to expand the research to focus on how to detect the subtle attacks in
a large-scale of network effectively and efficiently.
The second challenge comes from higher demand for the overall view of the
entire network status (Zhao et al., 2014). Conventional visualization systems are often
limited in providing a relatively low-level view of the network because in most cases it’s
easier and more straightforward to visualize the low-level data. Consequently, human
analysts need to scroll through multiple visual graphs, trying to find the correlation and
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identify abnormal events and threats, which is often time-consuming and inadequate. A
high-level view of the network status will significantly decrease the impacts of
unnecessary details and amplify the underlying security events. Thus, providing an
informative high-level view of the network status is another goal of this research.

1.3

Scope

This project primarily consisted of three major phases: design, implementation,
and evaluation.
Based on the behaviors of network intrusions, design phase identified the
characteristics and patterns of different intrusions and summarize the data of interest
that should be preprocessed and visualized. Three types of network intrusions are the
primary interests of this research: port scanning, denial of service attacks, and data
exfiltration. The system has multi-view of visualization, providing high-level overview as
well as low-level details of points of interest.
In the implementation phase, a web server powered by Node.js was set up, a
MySQL database was used to store the raw and processed network traffic data, and
visual components were implemented with a popular JavaScript visualization library
D3.js. It should be noticed that D3.js is not security-specific; it’s no more than a
web-based data visualization library using HTML, SVG and CSS. The ease of use,
powerful visualization capability, and support for all major browsers make D3.js a
popular choice in web-based data visualization.
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Finally, the system was tested and evaluated with the dataset from Mini
Challenge 3 of VAST challenge 2013 (VAST, 2013). The dataset was chosen because the
data is NetFlow data, which is more appropriate for high level overview visualization
(more discussion on this in Chapter 2). And the dataset is collected from a mid-sized
network (approximately 1,200 servers and hosts), thus it’s large enough to test the
scalability of the approach. The evaluation was conducted in two ways. The first is
through analysis of ad hoc use-case attack scenarios, which is to analyze the timeline of
some attacks events in the data (like when the attack happened and what hosts were
the targets). This is a common technique in evaluation of security visualization (Shiravi,
Shiravi, & Ghorbani, 2012). The second is a formal statistical evaluation by identifying all
the suspicious activities in the dataset. Because Visual Analytics Challenge Committee
(VAST) has provided ground truth for the dataset, it is convenient to evaluate the
system in a systematic manner, such as calculating Type I and Type II errors.

1.4

Research Question

Because we’re primarily focusing on three types of network attacks, the
corresponding research questions that were studied are:
1. Is Visual Analytical approach capable of detecting denial of service attacks
from NetFlow records?
2. Is Visual Analytical approach capable of detecting port scan attacks from
NetFlow records?
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3. Is Visual Analytical approach capable of detecting data exfiltration from
NetFlow records?
Here we use statistical hypothesis testing to define the research questions more
formally. False positive rate (FP) is the primary criteria and we set the thresholds as 0.10
In other words, if the false positive rate is less than 0.10, we presume that the VA
approach is capable of detecting intrusions. For denial of service attacks:
Null hypothesis: FP <= 0.10 for detecting denial of service attacks
Alternative hypothesis: FP > 0.10 for detecting denial of service attacks
This is a one-tailed test and we assume a significance level of 0.05. Similarly, we
have hypothesis for port scanning and data exfiltration respectively.

1.5

Assumptions

The following assumptions were identified as part of this research project:
1. The system was evaluated by the dataset from Mini Challenge 3 of VAST
challenge 2013. The dataset was treated as real network traffic data, even
though how the data was collected was not officially released.
2. Network traffic data collected was faithful to the actual network traffic and
was not modified by any types of worms or attacks.
3. The dataset used by the visualization system should follow a relatively strict
format and content; other types of network traffic data might not be able to
directly work properly in the system.
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4. The ground truth released from the VAST challenge committee, which was
used to evaluate the visualization, was considered correct and comprehensive.

1.6

Limitations

The research was conducted acknowledging the following limitations:
1. The dataset used in the research only contains two weeks’ network data and
the types of network intrusions may be not comprehensive.
2. The dataset was artificially designed for visualization security study.
3. In some cases, NetFlow records cannot provide completely trustworthy
information of network intrusions. For example, a distributed denial of service
(DDOS) attack with spoofed IPs may be seen as a denial of service attack (DOS)
from one external attacker.
4. The laboratory computer system had limitations in capacity and throughput,
which was only capable of processing and visualizing data in the order of a few
gigabytes.

1.7

Delimitations

This research was performed with the following delimitations:
1. The visual analytics system was designed to detect following types of network
intrusions: port scanning, denial of service attacks, and data exfiltration.
2. The dataset was chosen to evaluate the system because it can represent major
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network attack information and is designed to evaluate modern cyber-security
visual analytic approaches.
3.

D3.js is suitable for data visualization with HTML, SVG and CSS. D3’s emphasis
on web standards gives users the full capabilities of modern browsers. D3.js is
not a security-specific visualization library.

1.8

Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined an overview of the research project, including the
research topic, significance, question statement and scope. Assumptions, limitations
and delimitations of the research have also been presented. In the next chapter,
relevant researches on network intrusions and visual analytics for security will be
examined and discussed.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the past twenty years, various techniques and approaches have been
proposed and heavily studied to detect network intrusions and attacks, such as
statistics-based, pattern-based, rule-based and visual-based (Liao et al., 2013). Among
them, visual-based approach attracts significant attention because of the interactive
participation of human analysts. Human analysts have remarkable ability to handle
novel patterns, outliners and exceptions. Comparing to other automated approaches, a
visual analytics system provides human analysts with improved tools to detect
anomalies, discover hidden patterns, identify inherent correlations, and communicate
findings with colleagues (Goodall, 2008).

2.1

Comparisons of Intrusion Detection Approaches

Traditionally, there are two major approaches for intrusion detection, namely
anomaly detection and misuse detection. With proposes and development of various
systems and tools, people tend to subdivide these approaches into more subcategories
(Liao et al., 2012; Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2011). Four common approaches for
network intrusion detection are discussed in this section: algorithmic, rule-based,
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threshold-based, and visual-based. Other than these, pattern-based, state-based and
heuristic-based are also widely used methodologies of intrusion detection. The
algorithmic approach usually uses statistical tests, probabilistic analysis and models, or
data mining to analyze network traffic (Jung et al., 2004). Abnormal network traffic and
packets can be detected through this approach. Recently, Yen et al. (2013) designed a
detection system called Beehive that automatically mines and extracts knowledge and
insights from various logs data generated by a variety of network devices in a large
enterprise. With the help of a common clustering algorithm (an adapted version of the
K-means clustering algorithm), Beehive detected network intrusions (including the port
scanning) that went otherwise unobserved by current security tools and personnel. Soft
computing is similar to the algorithmic approach in many ways. Many methods in this
approach use fuzzy logic-based algorithms, which provide flexible information
processing for handing real-life ambiguous situations (Zadeh, 1994).
The second approach is the rule-based approach, which applies various
pre-defined rules and policies to detect abnormal and suspicious traffic (Kim & Lee,
2008). In typical rule-based approaches, rules (If-Then or If-Then-Else) are used to build
the model and profile of known and common intrusions. For example, in a rule-based
system, a blacklist is often provided where all the traffic from the list’s IP addresses is
automatically blocked by the firewall or intrusion prevention system. Pattern-based
approach is similar to rule-based, which uses pattern matching technique in the
detection process.
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The third approach is threshold-based, which is an intuitive and widely used
technique to detect network attacks above certain thresholds by examining happenings
of event X across a Y-sized time frame (Gates, 2006). Nonetheless, it is rather difficult
and needs careful investigation to set an appropriate detection threshold: a low
threshold may mislabel some normal activates; whereas a relatively high threshold
would have difficulties to detect some malicious network traffic (Paxson, 1999).
The last approach is the visual-based. Visual-based approach is closely related to
“security visualization” or visual analytics. Security visualization is a relative young term
and it is a concrete field from the broader domain of information visualization (Marty,
2008). Security visualization has the benefits of information visualization but demands
novel and fine-tuned techniques for thorough and in-depth analysis, because common
visualization systems have been constructed for use scenarios that are not well
supportive of detecting intrusions from network traffic (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani,
2011). Visual analytics puts more emphasis and efforts on human side, and it provides a
solution that combines the strengths and powers of human analysts and electronic data
processing. Because for most enterprise networks, security administration is still a
process that needs human involvement, visual analytics approach enable people to
derive insights from dynamic, ambiguous and massive data, synthesize information,
discover the unexpected and outliners, and communicate efficiently for further action
(Keim et al., 2008).
An important advantage of visual analytics approach is the flexible incorporation
of other approaches. In other words, techniques in rule-based or threshold-based
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approach can be used in visual analytics. Well-designed visual analytics components can
significantly help human analysts to process and understand the information and
underlying indications from other approaches.

2.2

Categories of Network Security Visualization

Like all the information visualization, network security visualization is data-driven
process. Goodall (2007) organized the network security visualization into three major
categories based on the level of network traffic data to be analyzed and visualized:
packet trace visualization, NetFlow records visualization, and security events
visualization. Shiravi, Shiravi, & Ghorbani (2011) provided a detailed list of possible data
sources that are accessible and can be used in the implementation of visualization tools
and systems, and the related three categories are given in Table 2.1.
The first category is “packet trace visualization”, which is to visualize raw packet
traces, the most granular level of network traffic data. Normally, packet trace data can
be collected from packet analyzer such as Tcpdump and Wireshark. A network packet
consists of two types of data: control information (also known packet header) and user
data (also known as payload). A packet is the basic unit of data transmitted in a
packet-switched network. Therefore, network packets theoretically contain all the
information related to network intrusions.
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Table 2.1 Potential Data Sources for Security Visualizations
Event Type

Data Source

Device & Software

Network

Packet Trace

Tcpdump, Tshark, Wireshark

Traces

NetFlow Records

Cisco NetFlow NDE, Cisco NSEL NetFlow
Cisco CSA, Cisco IDS, Enterasys Dragon,

Intrusion Detection Systems

FortinetFortigate, Juniper ISG, SNORT,
NiksunNetVCR, SourceFireSensor

Security
ForeScoutConterACT, Juniper NetScreen
Events
IDP,

McAfee

Intrushield,

Radware

Intrusion Prevention Systems
Defense Pro, FireEye, Tipping Point X,
IPAngel

Visualization systems like Portall, Radial Traffic, VISUAL, TNV and Svision all use
packet traces as the primary data sources (Fink, Muessig, & North, 2005; Keim et al.,
2006; Ball, Fink, & North, 2004; Goodall et al., 2005; Onut, & Ghorbani, 2007). Portall
uses a “node and link” graph to represent the host and connection in a network. VISUAL
utilizes scatter plot and IP matrix to depict the connections, allowing human analyst to
check connection patterns between the internal network and external hosts. TNV is
trying to provide a focused observation on packet level data without losing the
high-level network context. As displayed in Figure 2.1, TNV shows approximately five
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thousand network packets in a 90 minutes time period. A matrix with connection is used
to depict network activities of hosts over time and each host in the matrix is painted in
different colors based on its level of connection activity. Multiple linked views are
further used to display details of raw packets (Goodall et al., 2005).

Figure 2.1 A screen snapshot of TNV system.

An obvious drawback of packet trace visualization presents an incredible amount
of details, which challenges human analysts to understand the data efficiently. Even for
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a relatively small network, the amount of involved packets is considerably significant,
thus visualization at packet level is rather difficult and presenting too many unnecessary
details to human analysts. As a result, packet trace visualization is more suitable in a
hierarchy or multiple-layer deign, where detailed information of individual packets can
be provided on demand (Goodall et al., 2006). On the other hand, systems like TNV are
directly visualizing low-level network data in the overview without any aggregation and
filtering. It’s rather difficult for human analysts to observe any significant patterns or
discover the underlying security events. Thus it is meaningful to provide an informative
high-level view of the network status instead of directly visualizing low-level data.
The second category is “network flow visualization”, which is to visualize the
network flow data. In network flow data, a series of packets between two hosts is
combined into a single flow record. In practice, Cisco NetFlow NDE or Cisco NSEL
Netflow can be used to collect the NetFlow data for enterprise networks. A NetFlow
record is typically consisted of the protocol, source and destination Internet Protocol
addresses, the source and destination ports, payload size, session length and so forth.
Therefore, NetFlow records are much more compact comparing to packet traces by
sacrificing details and real payload data (Goodall, 2007).
Generally, such aggregations of packet trace in network flows remove the heavy
burden of visualizing all the granular level details, thus it’s widely used in many security
visualization systems. NVisionIP, VizFlowConnect, NetBytes Viewer and NFlowVis are all
using NetFlow as the primary data source (Lakkaraju, Yurcik, & Lee, 2004; Yin et al., 2004;
Taylor, Brooks, & McHugh, 2008; Fischer et al., 2008). For example, Phan et al. (2008)
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developed a system called “Isis”, which used progressive multiples of event plots and
timelines to provide the iterative examination of network traffic using network flow
data.

Figure 2.2 User interface of NFlowVis system.

Figure 2.2 displays the user interface of NFlowVis, which combines TreeMap
visualization and a clustering algorithm to analyze NetFlow data. The user interface of
the visualization system following a drill-down metaphor, guiding human analysts from
overall network activity’s overview to aggregated views of IDS and NetFlow data. It

18
should be noticed that they utilize a clustering algorithm to analyze the traffic data, and
the authors believe such clustering technique is suitable for data visualization in
large-scale network. This example illustrates an advantage of visual analytics: it can
incorporate other techniques and approaches (like clustering algorithm or pattern
matching) in the visualization. Because network flows are much more compact than
packet traces, we believe that the network flow data is more suitable for explore the
temporal relationships of network traffic in large-scale, and the system enables human
analysts to organize the visualizations to disclose traffic structure more easily.
The third category is “intrusion alert visualization”, which is to visualize the
intrusion alerts from an intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS monitors network
traffic and generates security alerts for malicious activities or policy violations. There are
many IDS products, such as Cisco CSA, Cisco IDS, Enterasys Dragon, and
FortinetFortigate. Generally, intrusion detection in IDSs is an automated process
(rule-based or signature-based) and the alerts data is a higher level of network traffic.
Thus intrusion detection alerts data is a very common and important data source for
many visualization detection systems.
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Figure 2.3 User interface of IP Matrix system, where the left view displays network
activities at Internet-level and the right view displays activates at local-level.

Figure 2.3 is a snapshot of IP Matrix system, which directly visualizes the security
alarms (Koike, Ohno, & Koizumi, 2005). The left view displays network activities at
Internet-level and the right view displays activates at local-level. A security alarm
generated by an IDS is mapped to a pixel inside the corresponding matrix cell and the
color of the pixel indicates the type of the intrusion. There are many more systems
utilizing the IDS alerts. For example, NIVA utilizes alert data from various intrusion
detectors and use links and different colors to signify attacks (Nyarko et al., 2002). The
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link color indicates the severity of intrusions. The system is able to present millions of
nodes, but will fail when the alert data is significantly large. VisAlert incorporates a
novel visualization paradigm, which displays visual correlation of network attack alerts
from various logs (Livnat et al., 2005). The authors argued that an alert must have three
attributes, namely: What, When and Where. A chord diagram is used to display the
three attributes of intrusion alerts. Zhao et al. (2014) use a similar radial graph in their
visualization system MVSec. The radar view provides an overview of alerts events and
their inherent associations. Intrusion alert visualization system are solely replying on the
IDSs and a major problem of IDSs, is the massive amount of security alerts they generate.
The massive alerts on a daily basis can easily exhaust security analysts (Debar & Wespi,
2001). Systems like NIVA and VisAlert have difficulties when visualize intrusion alerts in
a relatively long period of time. Additionally, false positives and false negatives are fairly
common in IDSs, regardless of their detection mechanisms. Thus it’s impossible to solely
rely on intrusion alerts. Packet trace or data flow data should be used to assist in
reduction of false positives and improvement of the system.
It should be noticed that there are many industry products in this category.
Security Information and event management (SIEM) is a popular technology provides
analysis of security threats and alerts (Ardito et al., 2000). Many vendors provide SIEM
solutions, such as McAfee Enterprise Security Manager, SolarWinds Log & Event
Manager, Splunk Enterprise, and HP ArcSight ESM. Although most of them have visual
components, they are merely the visualization of the intrusion alarms from IDSs and the
performance of system is heavily depending on the IDSs.

21
From the discussion above, it’s clear that these three levels of visualizations have
different advantages and emphasis. Packet trace visualization focuses on the most
granular level of network data, resulting in introducing too many unnecessary details.
Network flow visualization is at a higher level, and more suitable for visualization of
larger-size network. Intrusion alert visualization utilizes the alerts from IDS as data
source, and often needs lower level of data (packet or flow) to assist in reduction of
false alerts and improve accuracy.
Here network flow data is chosen as the major data source because visualization
of large scale of network is the foremost interest and concern in this research project.
Packet trace and intrusion alert data can be used to extend the visualization or provide
another level of information, but it’s not the primary goal of this research.

2.3

Network Intrusions and Their Visual Detection Methodologies
2.3.1 Port Scanning

Port scanning is to seek open ports and available services on a network host by
observing responses to connection requests (Vivo et al., 1999). Port scanning is very
common, possibly the preliminary step in a network intrusion attempt. There are
theoretically 65,535 ports for a computer host, where only small portions of them are
“well-known” ports, such as 20 for FTP and 80 for HTTP. The many uncommon ports are
probably being used by other software or services, depending on the situation.
Attackers can uncover vulnerabilities of network hosts and launch corresponding attacks
by gathering and analyzing the information of port scanning. Port scanning is normally
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not a direct security threat by itself; however, security analysts can prepare for future
attacks from the early detection of port scanning. In the practice, launching a port scan
to a network or certain hosts is a trivial task with the help of software such as Nmap.
Port scanning can be detected in many visualization systems and tools. One
common approach is to visualize host connections to classify patterns of port scanning.
Conti and Abdullah (2004) use parallel coordinate plots to visualize the network traffic
information, including IP addresses and port numbers. They have found some significant
visual patterns, which are results of some common port scan attack software. Parallel
coordinate plot is very suitable to visual multi-dimensional data. Network traffic
information, such as protocol type (TCP or UDP), source IP address, destination IP
address, source port and destination port can be used for parallel coordinate
visualizations, and common port scanning would have some obvious fingerprints in the
visualization.
In a similar approach, Jiawan et al. (2008) utilize network connections and mapped
them to host-based visualization that highlights port scanning patterns in their system
“ScanViewer”, as depicted in Figure 2.4. In the paper, the host-based visualization used
nodes to represent hosts (IP addresses) and lines to represent their inner connections.
In the Figure 2.4, the two nodes in circle clearly have the connection pattern of port
scanning. However, in reality the network traffic data is extremely large and dynamic,
and thus the port scanning traffic in this visualization may be obscured by high-volume
ordinary network connections, and hence the port scanning patterns cannot be
identified by the human analysts.
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Figure 2.4 A snapshot of ScanViewer. It captures the pattern of port scanning or
networking scanning. The two red-circled hosts are external attackers.

Another widely-used visual technique is port based because port activity of a
network is essentially vital in port scanning. Fischer and Keim (2013) combined some
interactive visualization views in their visualization system, with a tree map to display
the most active ports and node-link graphs to represent and examine inner connections
between different ports of network hosts. Port based approaches can be easily show
the most active ports during a period of time, but the port scan patterns are not
obvious.
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2.3.2 Denial of Service
A denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack generally
targets popular sites or services and attempts to disrupt or suspend the connection of
the servers. A common method of DoS attack is server overload, which is to saturating
the server with large amount of communications requests, making it cannot respond to
legitimate requests normally. From the viewpoint of enterprise network, such DoS or
DDoS attack is usually easy to be detected because the sudden high volume traffic to
the internal servers. Similar to port scanning, DoS or DDoS attack has the obvious
connection pattern: one or many external hosts (attackers) attempts to suspend the
service of specific internal servers (one-to-one pattern or many-to-one pattern).
Denial of service attacks can be readily identified by many visualization systems
because of the extremely massive burst of network traffic. NVisionIP displays a snapshot
of the activities of the network hosts, providing the information such as connection
activity and port activity. In the cases where internal servers under surveillance are
attacked by DDoS, human analysts will notice abrupt bursts in network traffic from
these servers (Lakkaraju, Yurcik, & Lee, 2004). However, the authors also pointed out if
the DDoS attack was adequately distributed, NVisionIP will not identify the attackers
and victims, as the volume of network packets sent by each involved attacker will be too
low to differentiate from normal network traffic. NVisionIP focuses on visualizing
external hosts, namely the attackers. Another approach is to visualize the activity of
internal servers. For a high-profile web server, it’s impossible to flood the service by a
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limited of requests. Thus in most cases, denial of service attack in terms of server
overload is quite easy to be identified.
Other than the “flooding” method, denial of service can be launched by in many
different ways, such as disruption of routing information or crash the server by
malwares. These attacks don’t have the significant volume of involved traffic, but it can
be detected by visualizing the working status of server (Zhao et al., 2014).

2.3.3 Data Exfiltration
Data exfiltration is another critical intrusion for any enterprise network and the
possibility of a sensitive data leak lies among the highest fears of security analysts.
Detecting data exfiltration is a challenging problem, because it’s not always easy to
identify which data is leaving the enterprise network legitimately, and which data traffic
is data exfiltration on purpose (Giani, Berk, & Cybenko, 2006).
Unlike port scanning or denial of service attack, data exfiltration has no obvious
pattern from network connections because it often occurs from one internal host
directly to another external host. Moreover, network flow data doesn’t have the
payload content, thus it’s impossible to directly visualize the payload or its signature.
D’Amico & Kocka (2005) pointed out that volume of data transferred can be used to
identify data exfiltration. In most cases, when large volume of data transferred occurs
from a host that is not recognized for such activities, it might indicate a potential data
exfiltration. Thus it is possible to identify data exfiltration through visualizing payload
sizes of network flows. It should be noticed that because not all the data exfiltration
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involve large data transfer or the exfiltration can be processed in a slow manner (such as
slow scan), this detection approach of visualizing data transfer sizes is not
comprehensive.
Foresti et al. (2006) used another approach to identify data exfiltration. They
believed they could characterize an external attacker with five distinct stages, which are
reconnaissance, probe, attack, dig-in and migration. During the five stages, as it moves
from normal network activity to data exfiltration, the visualization will show how the
node under attack slowly emerges out of the background. For a subtle data exfiltration
(no significant payload size), the attack stage might be difficult to be detected and
visualized but the probe stage could provide more relevant information, which usually
involves a network scanning or a port scanning. Goodall & Sowul (2009) detected data
exfiltration in a similar approach. First they identify a slow scan, which took place over a
period of about one hour. As they further investigate the event, they found that every
connection to port scan attacker consisted of a small payload packet, so it is doubtful
that the source host tried to steal any data. In this case, they also used an earlier probe
stage to identify the data exfiltration.
In the research project, because packet payload content is not available, large
volume of data transferred from a host that is not recognized for such activities may be
the only practical way to identify data exfiltration.
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2.4

Chapter Summary

This chapter first provides a brief summary of different network intrusion
detection approaches, which include algorithmic, rule-based, threshold-based, and
visual. Next, it focuses on visual-based approaches and describes three levels of network
security visualization based on different levels of networking data to be visualized,
which are packet trace visualization, network flow visualization and intrusion alert
visualization. In the last part of this chapter, four types of network intrusions (port
scanning, denial of service attacks, botnets, and data exfiltration) and their visual
detection methodologies are discussed.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter will cover the methodology of the research project, primarily
introducing and outlining the major research phases, system components, data sources
and analysis, and system evaluation used in the project.

3.1

Design Framework

The design phase was the first and the foremost important step of the research.
Based on the network flow data and characteristics of different types of intrusions, the
visual analytics design was characteristics-based. On other words, the design primarily
focused on how to represent and visualize patterns of intrusions based on the NetFlow
data. Because the data is typically in large-scale, techniques such as aggregating and
filtration were used to amplify the underlying security events.

Figure 3.1 Methodology for this research project
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3.2

Major Research Phases

The research project was consisted of three major phases as in Figure 3.1,
though they’re not inherently independent.
1. Designing the visual components of the system. This is the most important
step of the research project. Generally speaking, the designing phase
determined what information in the network traffic data would be used and
how they would be visualized in the system. Based on the characteristics and
patterns of different network intrusions, corresponding information and
metrics of network traffic data were retrieved, summarized and visualized.
2. Implementing the visualization system. Implementation phase included
following procedures: preprocessing the data and importing it to a database,
setting up the web server and coding the visualization part of the system.
3. Evaluating the visualization system. For the dataset that was used in the
project, information and facts about the network intrusions are listed in a
separate file. Thus by comparing with the “ground truth sheet”, the
visualization system can be evaluated. In fact, based on the feedbacks of
evaluation, the designing and implementation of visual components were
modified accordingly to achieve better results. This is like the typical iterative
cycle of software development.
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3.3

System Workflow

A typical workflow for Visual Analytical systems is displayed in Figure 3.2 (Zhao et
al., 2014). For this project, the first workflow was data preprocessing. After cleaning and
aggregating the raw data, the preprocessed data were imported into database. The
visual analytics component connected to the database, retrieving necessary information
from the aggregated data. Meanwhile, the visual analytics components provided an
interface for human analysts to interact with the system.
Essentially, the system was a web application, which consisted of a backend
database, a web server, and frontend web interface.
1. A MySQL database was used to store the network traffic data.
2. A simple web server powered by Node.js. Node.js is an open-sourced platform
to build fast, scalable network applications.
3. Frontend web interface was built with standard HTML, CSS and JavaScript. In
particular, an open-sourced JavaScript library d3.js was heavily used to build
the visualization components. It should be noticed that D3.js is not
security-specific; it’s no more than a web-based data visualization library using
HTML, SVG and CSS.
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Figure 3.2 A typical of workflow for the visual analytics system.

3.4

Data Sources and Data Analysis

In the evaluation phase, a dataset from Mini Challenge 3 of VAST challenge 2013
was heavily used. The original dataset includes three separate CSV files: network traffic
data, network hosts status data and network intrusion alert data. The network traffic
data is the primarily data used in the research project. It contains of two weeks of
network traffic data (flow-level) for an enterprise network, which includes
approximately 1,200 hosts and server. The data has roughly 70 million data records, and
takes about 4GB disk space. More specific, the network traffic data (NetFlow) contains
IP addresses, port numbers, transaction payloads, transaction time length and other
information about the network transaction through the local network.
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3.5

System Evaluation

The evaluation was conducted in two ways. The first is through analysis of ad hoc
use-case attack scenarios, which is a common technique in evaluation of security
visualization (Shiravi, Shiravi, &Ghorbani, 2012). In the ad-hoc evaluation, different
types of intrusions, including port scanning attack, denial of service attack, and data
exfiltration were fully evaluated. Ad-hoc evaluation is a typical way to evaluate a
security system. Also, how the system is interacted with users (security administrators
and analysts in this case) is also important, such as the process speed of the system,
ease of use, and so on.
The second is a formal statistical evaluation by identifying all the suspicious
activities in the dataset. Aground truth sheet has been provided by the Visual Analytics
Challenge Committee (VAST), and the security events have been labeled into two
categories: “obvious” and “subtle”. Generally, subtle attacks is much harder to be
detected, thus they are the primary interests of the evaluation process. It is convenient
to evaluate the system in a systematic manner with ground truth, such as measuring
efficiency, calculating Type I and Type II errors.
Efficiency is defined as the ratio of correctly detected attacks (i.e. true positives)
to all events flagged as an attack (sum of true positives and false positives) (Staniford et
al., 2002). Type I and Type II errors are often used interchangeably with the general
notion of false positive and false negative, respectively. False positive (Type I error) and
false negative (Type II error) are two indicators to assess the accuracy of IDS system.
False positive arises when the system mistakenly classifies normal activity as being
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malicious, whereas the false negative occurs if the system fails to classify malicious
activity.
FP and FN are very import factors when assessing an IDS system, but they are
closely related to the volume of normal traffic compared with the volume of attack
traffic (in other words, the acceptable rate for FP and FN are quite different for different
networks). For example, given that attacks are fairly infrequent comparing to the normal
traffic, even when the FP rate is quite low, there are still massive false alerts generated
by IDS (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2011). In the case, the FP rate (10% or less) is
still not acceptable for the network intrusion system. However, for evaluating this
system prototype, false positive rate 10% is adequate and acceptable in most cases
considering the relatively small number of alerts raised. Therefore, in our research, the
hypotheses (the proposed visual analytics approach is capable of detecting subtle
attacks from network flow records) will be accepted when the false positive rate is less
than 10%, otherwise it will be rejected.
There are other merits widely used in evaluating IDS, such as efficiency and
detection rate. They were all calculated in the evaluation part, but not as the criterial to
assess the hypothesis of the research question. Goodall (2009) uses a popular packet
capture analysis tool called Wireshark in the evaluation for the comparison purpose. In
his experiment, Wireshark’s efficiency is 72.9%; meaning 72.9% of all the alerts are truly
attacks.
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3.6

Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of research methodology of this research
project. At first, it covered the three major phases for this research: namely designing
phase, implementation phase, and evaluation phase. This is a typical cycle for software
development. Next, the software and visualization libraries used in the research project
were introduced and they either have free versions or are open-sourced software. At
last, the data source and data analysis approach used in the system evaluation phase
was outlined.
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CHAPTER 4. VISUAL ANALTYICAL AND OVERVIEW DESIGN

Overview design is the first and most important step in the project. Before that,
we must gain some understanding of and insight into NetFlow data, which is the primary
data source format for this project. The insights will guide and facilitate the overview
design process, and in the meantime feedback from the overview will broaden our
knowledge about NetFlow data. This is a “mutual benefit” process.
In the process of creating the overview design, three primary goals are of
particular interest. The first is to highlight suspicious events or hosts from normal
background traffic data. This is the fundamental purpose and function of an overview. In
particular, it is challenging and significant to search for subtle attacks in the overview
because they usually hide deeper in the traffic and are more difficult to detect. By
“subtle” we mean attacks with few related inconspicuous NetFlow records, or in a very
short period of time, or with some characteristics that make them more difficult to
detect.
Second, the overview should be scalable. As discussed in the literature review
section, some effective intrusion detection methods have difficulty with a large amount
of network data. This is generally normal for visual analytics because many VA solutions
rely on human analysts to discover abnormal and suspicious parts, while the
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abnormality will become inconspicuous in a large amount of data. If VA solutions rely
only on the raw data to visualize and do not provide an effective method (such as data
mining) to reduce the negative impact of the data size, scalability is rather hard to
satisfy.
In our overview design, we are not using the conventional visual techniques
(such as time series or connection visualization) directly; instead, we are trying to
highlight security events based on the attributes of aggregated NetFlow records and
characteristics of intrusion attacks. Therefore, the overview in our approach has some
degree of scalability.
The last goal is to make the overview extendable. Even though three types of
attack are the primary interest of the project, the VA solution in our project should
provide general information about network status (situational awareness) and the
ability to be extended to detect other network security attacks in the future.
Therefore, in Chapter 4, with these three motivations in mind, the process of
visual analytical and overview design and details of the VA system are presented and
discussed, with emphasis on the characteristics of NetFlow and the features of network
attacks. In particular, conventional visual analytical techniques, such as time series plots
and heat maps, are discussed to address why they do not fit into the overview directly
but can be useful in other ways. Then two primary overviews of this project are
presented, explaining why they can enable human analysts to identify network
intrusions and provide scalability and extensibility at the same time.

37
4.1

Time Series Analysis

NetFlow is the primary data source for the project, and a significant
characteristic of NetFlow data is that every entry is associated inherently with a
timestamp that indicates when the NetFlow is recorded. Therefore, time series analysis
is a straightforward method to inspect NetFlow data.
A simple way to visualize data associated timestamp is to display the number of
NetFlow records (NetFlow count) over a time interval. Figure 4.1 illustrates a time series
of NetFlow count on April 13 for Big Marketing Network. Because this time series simply
counts how many NetFlow entries were recorded per minute, it can reveal intensity of
network activity: A strong peak in time series generally indicates a sudden event
involving a great number of NetFlow entries, which may be a normal network traffic
peak, a denial-of-service (DOS) attack, a port-scan attack, or a number of other options.

Figure 4.1 Time series of NetFlow count for Big Marketing Network in Apr 13
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From Figure 4.1, it is clear that there are several significant peaks between 6 a.m.
and 9 a.m., the number reaching almost 10,000 per minute at one point. This is
abnormally huge, considering the baseline number. Most of these peaks in the early
morning are actually the consequence of a port-scan attack targeting a few internal
servers. Other than the noticeable peaks, however, time series analysis provides little
insight regarding network status. For example, from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., the time series
seems flat, and if there were a data exfiltration event (which usually uses very few
NetFlow records to communicate), it would be difficult to detect from the NetFlow
count time series. Therefore, the drawback of time series analysis in this case is obvious:
Only NetFlow count is inspected and under consideration, whereas subtle network
threats involving only a few NetFlow records cannot be seen easily from the overview.
Attacks such as data exfiltration and malware infection are generally related to a very
limited number of hosts and NetFlow records.
Analysis of Figure 4.1 shows that it is impossible to find various attacks based on
one parameter (NetFlow count). An improvement over this approach is to present
different parameters (attributes of NetFlow) for time series analysis at the same time,
such as number of distinct IP addresses, number of distinct port numbers, and so forth,
as in Figure 4.2. In this multiple time series, the blue graph at the top represents
NetFlow count, the orange graph in the middle represents distinct source IP addresses,
and the green graph at the bottom represents distinct source port numbers. Observing
and comparing these three graphs simultaneously reveals more details of network
activity. The blue and green time series are very similar to each other in their shapes
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and trends, indicating that attackers might use different ports to increase the
throughput of attacking traffic, making the attack more severe.

Figure 4.2 Multi-Time series of NetFlow count, IP count, port count for
Big Marketing Network in Apr 13

Multi-time series can provide information about different aspects of network
traffic. Potentially, it can depict one time series for each NetFlow attribute. This is still
not a great solution to the problem, however. First, it is not easy to find correlations
between the graphs. If we present six time series graphs at the same time, finding the
relationships among them is not easy for human analysts. Second, multiple time series
still present the same problem as a single time series: Subtle security events are often
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overshadowed by obvious and significant network traffic and events. Therefore, even
though time series analysis is a good approach for analyzing network traffic trending
from different angles and providing general situation awareness information, it is not
always scalable when dealing with a large amount of network traffic data.

4.2

Heat Maps Analysis

A heat map is a common graphical representation of data. It is a visual analytical
technique in which the data values represented in a matrix are given different colors.
Essentially, time series spread the data along one parameter, which is usually a
timestamp. Because heat maps display data in a matrix, it is appropriate to present the
distribution of data in two dimensions. As with time series, an inevitable disadvantage is
that subtle events will be overshadowed by other more significant events and normal
background traffic. In a 2-D heat map, we can break NetFlow into different matrix cells
according to their attributes to highlight both obvious events and subtle ones. Ideally,
subtle security events can be extracted from the background data by some attributes.
This is also a core notion in our VA design, which relies heavily on the characteristics of
intrusion attacks.
In NetFlow content, in addition to timestamp and IP information, a few fields are
closely related to attacks of interest: port number, payload size, and session duration.
Port-scan attacks are clearly associated with targeted ports because the purpose of a
port scan is to retrieve information about the port activities of hosts. Payload size is a
primary factor in determining data exfiltration because NetFlow does not have any
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information about the real content of payload, and we can only rely on the payload size
to find suspicious traffic; an unusually large payload size generally indicates a potential
data exfiltration. Meanwhile, monitoring payload size has some possible use; many
companies strictly forbid uploading or downloading large files through enterprise
networks. In the NetFlow data, there are two fields related to flow payload:
“firstSeenSrcPayload” and “firstSeenDestPayload.” This is because NetFlow represents a
series of packets transferred between two hosts, possibly indicating direction. In this
case, “firstSeenSrcPayload” means the total payload of all packets to “firstSeenSrcIP,”
and “firstSeenDestPayload” means the total payload of all packets to “firstSeenDestIP.”
Furthermore, attacks such as denial of service and port scanning often present
smaller payload size and shorter session length than usual. This is easy to understand; A
normal user visits a website and would expect to retrieve content from the website, but
an attack that launches a denial-of-service or port-scan attack attempts to shut down
the service or simply obtain port information as quickly as possible, resulting in small
payload size and short session duration.
Similarly, it is impossible to detect redirection behaviors via HTTP status code or
packet headers because NetFlow does not provide such information. In a common
server redirection, an external user connects to the infected server, and usually the
page will be redirected to external malicious websites right away, resulting in extremely
small payload size and short duration. As a result, small flow size and short flow
duration are also two primary characteristics of server redirection.
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This analysis demonstrates that payload size and session length are two key
parameters in the detection of network attacks such as data exfiltration, denial of
service, and server redirection.

Figure 4.3 A heat map for NetFlow in Big Marketing

Therefore, NetFlow duration and payload can be used as primary attributes in
heat maps. Figure 4.3 shows a heat map for Big Marketing Network’s NetFlow, where
the x-axis represents session duration length (in seconds) and the y-axis represents
payload size (in bytes). The different shades of color indicate different amount of
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NetFlow and darker cells indicate more NetFlow recorded in that range. In Figure 4.3,
some cells in the matrix are blank with no color pixel, which means that there were no
NetFlow in those ranges.
A heat map can be used to represent distribution of NetFlow in a time frame,
such as 1 hour, 1 day, or even 1 week. A potential problem here is that one heat map
displays only a chosen time period; it cannot clearly present changes in network status
(trending during the time period), which is important in analyzing security events.
Security analysts need to go through many heat maps to monitor a network. For
example, if one heat map represents 1 hour of NetFlow, 2 weeks of data for Big
Marketing Network will produce approximately 336 graphs, and examining all of them is
a tedious job. On the other hand, if the time frame if too long, such as 1 day or even 1
week, the overview potential loses a lot of information because it is impossible to use
color to represent one day’s network status; should it represent the maximum,
minimum, or average value?

4.3

Duration-Payload Overview Design

From the analysis of time series and heat maps, we see that both have inherent
disadvantages for dealing with NetFlow data. In this analysis we combine the two visual
techniques for our overview, producing a heat map that contains time series plots in the
matrix. Heat maps can help separate data into groups based on their attributes, and
time series plots provide baseline information to identify any abnormal parts for each
group.
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As we discussed in the previous section, session length and payload are primary
attributes that can help distinguish malicious NetFlow records from normal ones. As
seen in Figure 4.4, session duration and payload size are presented on the x-axis and
y-axis, respectively, and each cell marked as a rectangle represents the time series for
NetFlow count in the corresponding range during 2 weeks. For example, the bottom left
corner cell represents a time series for NetFlow with zero duration and zero payload
size.

Figure 4.4 Duration-Payload Overview Design with uniform linear scale
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Surprisingly, there are only a few peaks in the range of 10 bytes payload, while
most rectangular cells have no visible peaks. In this implementation, the time series
map has no color representation, and each cell in the map uses the same linear scale on
the y-axis; in other words, the highest count determines the y-axis domain for all cells.
In this way, every cell can be compared easily because they use the same scale. A
significant drawback of such a design is that some small-count events cannot be seen
easily from the overview because the largest count can be a thousand times or even a
million times larger than others. This is why only a few cells have visible peaks—because
their NetFlow counts in these cells are significantly larger than other ranges’ values. In
fact, further study confirmed that those significant peaks represent denial-of-service or
port-scan attacks.
A better method is to use a logarithmic scale in the y-axis. A logarithmic scale can
display small numbers better, as in Figure 4.5. Obviously, more peaks become visible
with a log10 on the y-scale in each rectangular cell. Nevertheless, people generally have
difficulty perceiving the values in a logarithm. For example, log10(100) = 2 and log10(1000)
= 3. Though 100 and 1000 are very different quantities, 2 and 3 are relatively close when
using visual representation. In Figure 4.5, it is difficult to tell the difference among the
peaks (many seem to have very close values, but in fact they vary a lot).
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Figure 4.5 Duration-Payload Overview Design with uniform logarithmic scale

If all the matrix cells use the same scale on the y-axis, it is difficult for analysts to
understand the overview. As in heat maps, color can be used to further distinguish
different ranges of time series values. In other words, different scales are represented
on the y-axis with colors, as in Figure 4.6. The shades of green represent the scale in
each cell; the darker the shade, the larger the scale. If two cells have the same green
background, they are using the same scale on the y-axis. The scale value increases by
approximately an order of 10.
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Figure 4.6 Duration-Payload Overview Design with colored scale

Essentially, Figure 4.6 contains the same data that Figures 4.4 and 4.5 do, but the
data in this visualization, even very small amount of NetFlow, can be seen and
compared easily. A closer look at Figure 4.6 indicates that the cells with the background
of the darkest green are the ones visible in Figure 4.4, because those are the time series
with the largest values (NetFlow count).
In Figure 4.6, the values chosen for different ranges need careful consideration.
On the y-axis, the payload size in bytes basically increases by an order of 10—0, 1, 10,
100, and so on—to the largest payload size. This is a very straightforward way to divide
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the payload values. The situation is quite different for duration length on the x-axis,
however. Many normal NetFlow sessions last 3 or 4 seconds, and very few last 1 or 2
seconds, so we pay more attention to the lower durations by dividing length into 9
ranges for Big Marketing Network: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5~9, 10~99, 100~999, and > 1000
seconds. Ideally, analysts should be able to define the ranges in their own
implementations because normal ranges will vary for different networks.
After discovering potential problems from the overview, we provide a
second-level visualization that offers a zoomed-in view of the cell graphs in the overview.
When the user clicks on any cell graph in the overview, the system will automatically
open a larger, zoomed-in image of that cell graph, as seen in Figure 4.7. The larger graph
is a scatter plot, where each point represents the count for 1 hour. We use 1 hour as the
time frame because we are dealing with 2 weeks of data. If the data is for 1 day, the
time frame can be changed to minutes.

Figure 4.7 Scatter plot of one cell graph from the VA overview
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Furthermore, an important feature of the VA overview is that it enables users to
analyze multiple cell graphs simultaneously. Analysts can choose a few cell graphs in the
overview, and the second level will visualize the content in the overview at the same
time by applying different colors to the scatter plot points. To distinguish the points
more clearly, each cell graph will be randomly assigned a border color that is highlighted
when the cell is chosen, as shown in Figure 4.8(a), and the corresponding points in the
second layer visualization will use that color, as shown in Figure 4.8(b). We think this
feature is essential in the VA overview design because it enables users to discover
potential patterns and relationships between the cell graphs in overview instead of
regarding them as isolated graphs. In the next chapter, we will see that many security
events are visible in multiple cell graphs and can be detected more easily from the
overview.
Though Figure 4.8(b) provides multiple colored points for comparison, it is not
easy for human analysts to see the small-count points because most of them are
together at the bottom of the graph, as the green points in Figure 4.8(b) are. Instead of
just using a linear scale, users can choose a logarithmic scale to spread the points, as in
Figure 4.8(c), to see the large-value points as well as the small-value points.

50

Figure 4.8(a) Duration-Payload Overview Design with three chosen cells

Figure 4.8(b) Scatter plot for the three selected cell graphs with linear scale
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Figure 4.8(c) Scatter plot for the three selected cell graph with logarithmic scale

In the next chapter, we will discuss in detail how the Duration-Payload overview
can effectively help human analysts identify network intrusions and provide situational
awareness.

4.4

Host-Flow View

Performing visual analytics on a big data set is akin to using a microscope. When
using a microscope, people generally find the area they are interested in under low
magnification and investigate it further under high magnification. It is difficult to use
high magnification directly. In performing visual analytics for network security, the
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overview plays the role of low magnification. It identifies the interesting or suspicious
time point and hosts, but it needs a means to investigate the events in detail.
The second level of visualization provides a zoomed-in view of the time series
graph, but it is also necessary to visualize the content of NetFlow. This brings us to the
third-level visualization, a Host-Flow view to provide information at the NetFlow level.
When users select any point in the second level’s scatter plots, the Host-Flow view
provides the content of NetFlow related to the selected data point.
As seen in Figure 4.9, the most detailed level is a visualization of network traffic
flow between two groups of IP addresses, generally one group of external hosts and one
group of internal hosts. Parallel coordinates visualization is a popular approach to
visualizing multidimensional information. NetFlow records contain multiple attributes,
such as source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destination port
number, flow payload, and session duration. Each of these attributes is represented by a
vertical coordinate in the graph.
A NetFlow data record will be visualized as a line, with corresponding
intersections at the coordinates. The default attributes in a parallel coordinates
visualization are source IP address, source port, destination port, destination IP address,
source payload, destination payload, session duration, and timestamp. In practice, users
can change the setup by adding or removing coordinates to satisfy their needs. The lines
are colored in the Host-Flow view to provide better and clearer visual representation.
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Figure 4.9 Parallel Coordinates visualization with 1000 NetFlow records

A potential problem for parallel coordinates visualization is the number of
NetFlow records to be visualized in one graph. If the number is too high (1,000 or more),
the visualization will be very difficult to analyze, as seen in Figure 4.9. Here we use a
very simple approach to solve the problem. Starting with the data point in level 2,
instead of visualizing all the NetFlow records, we randomly choose 100 records and use
them in the parallel coordinates visualization. Can this sample represent the population?
In most cases, especially in attack scenarios, the answer is yes. The primary reason is
that the first two levels of visualization have separate NetFlow records in different
groups, so the records for one data point in the second level (scatter plots) should
exhibit uniform behavior to some degree. In some rare cases, such as in a distributed
denial-of-service attack, some attackers may become invisible after visualization, but
analyzing all NetFlow records to the internal targets will easily reveal the whole picture.
In the next chapter, we will cover this topic in more detail.
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Figure 4.10 Parallel Coordinates visualization with selection feature

An important feature in Host-Flow view is the user-defined selection. Users can
select any range of coordinates to highlight in NetFlow records, as in Figure 4.10. In this
example, the user chose to investigate traffic from 10:20 a.m. to 10:50 a.m. with a
source payload of 140~180 bytes. Any NetFlow records in those ranges is highlighted
automatically.
In Host-Flow view, if two records have the same values for all attributes, they
will merge into a single line and cannot be distinguished from each other. Therefore, the
user can define a coordinate to represent the amount of NetFlow. The NetFlow count is
important in analyzing potential security events, such as denial-of-service and port-scan
attacks. For example, hundreds or thousands of packets sent to the server in a very
short time may indicate a denial-of-service attack. If there are only a few NetFlow
records, it is highly possible it is just normal web traffic. Therefore, NetFlow count can
be very useful in some cases.
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4.5

Host-MaxConn Overview

The Duration-Payload overview provides network traffic patterns for detecting
intrusions, but it does not provide any information about the internal hosts at the
overview level. A host-based (IP-based) visualization provides information or the status
of each host of interest. We believe such visualization is important in the overview
design because the status of internal hosts (such as important servers) is vital to
network administrators for monitoring the network system.
Host-based visualization is suitable for detecting intrusions that target certain
hosts because it treats every host separately. From the previous overview, some slow or
subtle port scans cannot be seen easily. The primary characteristics of a port-scan attack
are largely related to how many distinct internal “addresses” are accessed by an
external host during a short time of period. The “address” here is actually representing
IP address and port number because we’re dealing port scanning here. To detect port
scanning, we visualize the characteristics of a port scan for each internal host. Similarly,
such host-based visualization can be extended to denial of service, data exfiltration, or
simply server status information such as response time and CPU usage.
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Figure 4.11 Host-MaxConn Overview

Because it is a host-based design, a potential problem is scalability. If an internal
network has only a few hosts, visual representation of the hosts is relatively
straightforward. But when the number increases beyond about 200, the visual design
will be much more difficult. Our general idea is to highlight the more important servers
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by allocating more space to them. Servers are the central part of enterprise networks,
and we should pay more attention to them. For a typical enterprise network, even one
with several thousand hosts, the number of servers is limited. For example, in the data
set of VAST 2013, Big Marketing Network has approximately 1,200 hosts, and 22 of
them are servers (web server, DNS server, e-mail server, and so on). In Figure 4.11, the
very first chart represents external IP addresses, and the other three below denote Big
Marketing Network‘s three internal network sites. In the three internal horizontal
coordinates, IPs for the servers are placed in the middle and take more space; personal
hosts are placed at the two tails of the coordinate evenly.
The bigger concern is the external IP visualization. In our design, one chart is
used to visualize status of external IPs because attackers should be identified (at least
partially) from the overview. However, theoretically, there are approximately 4 billion
legitimate IP addresses (this is only for IPv4), and it is impossible to visualize them in any
way. In reality, a significant amount of them are not active (in other words, they are not
visiting any internal servers or reached by internal hosts). Therefore, in our design, we
only visualized active external IP addresses and put them uniformly in the horizontal
chart. In the case of Big Marketing Network, only about 200 active external hosts appear
in the 2 weeks’ data. If the number increases to a certain amount, external IPs will be
grouped to decrease the number of display IPs. Therefore, even though this is a
host-based design, it still has some scalability to easily handle a small or midsize
network.
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In Figure 4.11, the vertical axis represents the maximum connection rate for
each IP address, with upward lines representing inbound and downward lines
representing outbound. Connection rate represents how many distinct connections
were built during a unit time, where connection is defined by IP address and port
number. For a particular host, the value of the blue line represents the maximum
number of distinct outbound connections the host has made, and the red line
represents the maximum inbound connections. Host-MaxConn is used to find a host
that has an uncommon connection rate. When a user clicks on a suspicious host, a
corresponding Host-TimelineConn view provides time series information for the
selected host, as in Figure 4.12.

Figure 4.12 Host-TimelineConn view for one host

Host-TimelineConn visualizes time series data for a chosen host, instead of the
maximum value. In Figure 4.12, it’s easy to see that the X-axis represents time stamp,
and Y-axis represent inbound and outbound connection rate. In order to show their own
trending, these two time series are using different scales in Y-axis. This second-level
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view provides trends and patterns for a host’s connections, which could be very helpful
when analyzing a host’s activities. From our study, most of port scan attackers don’t
connect to the internal frequently, and the sudden increase of connection count can be
an important characteristic of potential external attackers. Finally, we can also use
Host-Flow view to analyze any data points of interest in a Host-TimelineConn
visualization. Therefore, for the two overviews (Duration-Payload and Host-MaxConn),
analysis procedures are similar: identify suspicious activities or hosts in the overviews,
analyze timeline in the second-level visualization, and investigate security events in
Host-Flow view.
A host-based overview can provide direct and precise information and status for
each host of interest, allowing analysts to discover intrusions targeted at particular
hosts. Even though here we use port scan as an example, the host-based overview can
be also be used to detect other kinds of network intrusions and provide situational
awareness information for important servers.

4.6

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we primarily introduce and describe two types of overviews:
Duratoin-Payload Overview and Host-MaxCoon Overview. We believe the former one is
capable of analyzing network traffic patterns and trending, whereas the latter one is
more suitable for providing information and status on per host basis. Other than the
two overviews, there are several zoomed-in visualizations, to investigate any suspicious
activates in details. Such multiple-level design offers scalability for the system, letting
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human analysts to identify IP or time point at overview, and investigate further with
zoomed-in views. In the next chapter, we’ll describe how the VA system can be applied
to detect different types of intrusions.
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CHAPTER 5.

SECURITY EVENTS ANALYSIS

Based on characteristics of NetFlow data and network intrusions, we have
designed two overviews for the project: Duration-Payload and Host-MaxConn. The
former is designed to present traffic patterns according to NetFlow’s session duration
and payload size, and the latter will display maximum incoming and outgoing
connection rates on a per-host basis. In this chapter, we will discuss how to apply these
two overviews to identify network intrusions, especially focusing on denial of service,
port scanning, and data exfiltration. Multiple-level visualizations, which provide more
detailed information, will also be used.

5.1

General Guides to Read Duration-Payload Overview

The Duration-Payload overview provides facts on the distribution of NetFlow
records and timeline information. Moreover, it can help human analysts determine
network status, such as incoming traffic patterns and trends. Thus, it also provides both
situational awareness and intrusion detection alerts. Situational awareness is important
for intrusion detection systems because even the best system cannot cover all types of
attacks. Therefore, to detect possible abnormalities, we have to know what the network
looks like normally.
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As we discussed in the previous chapter, session duration and payload size are
two important attributes in NetFlow. An unusually short duration and small payload
generally indicate a port-scan or denial-of-service attack; while long duration and large
payload mean a large file transfer, which is possible data exfiltration. It should be noted
that there is no strict line for the duration length and payload size; they will vary for
different networks. Overall, however, most NetFlow records with mid-range session
duration and payload size are normal traffic. This conclusion is applicable only when we
analyze NetFlow data. If we have the real content of the payload, that requires a totally
different approach.
In Figure 5.1, the cell graphs in the blue rectangle are the “normal” zone, and we
are assuming most of the records within it are normal traffic to servers. Apart from the
mid-range criteria, an important characteristic of a normal cell graph is that it contains
consistent and regular traffic data, which means if the NetFlow data in that range are
normal, it should be visible many times during the 2 weeks, not just a burst of traffic or a
significant isolated peak. Further study identified some NetFlow records related to
intrusion in this normal zone, but most of them are regular network traffic according to
the ground truth.
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Figure 5.1 Duration-Payload Overview with normal zone (blue rectangle) and suspicious
zones (red rectangles) highlighted

On the contrary, the bottom left corner with very short session duration and
very small payload size is probably the result of denial-of-service or port-scan attacks,
while the top right corner with very long session duration and large payload size may be
related to data exfiltration. We will discuss the details of these graph cells in the
following sections. From the graph, it is clear that many of those cells contain isolated
peaks, which means that normally there are no NetFlow records in that range, and the
peaks may indicate unexpected security events.
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Figure 5.2 A zoomed-in scatter plot for “normal” activities

A Duration-Payload overview also provides situational awareness to some
degree. From the overview in Figure 5.1, a careful investigation indicates that all the cell
graphs have a blank period during the 2 weeks. When we zoom in to the scatter plot in
Figure 5.2, from the afternoon of April 7 to the end of April 10, there is no sign of any
server activity. The ground truth states that Big Marketing Network had network
maintenance during the weekend, so no servers were running during that period. From
this example, it is clear that the overview can provide network status in addition to
detecting intrusions.
Another example usage of Figure 5.2 is to analyze trends in server access. In
Figure 5.2, the red dots in the second week have an obvious pattern. The red dots peak
at approximately 8 a.m. and then consistently decrease to a stable level, about 500.
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Further analysis from the host-flow view indicates that traffic related to red dots is
actually mail service. As a result, we have a general knowledge of the users’ pattern of
accessing mail service in Big Marketing Network.

5.2

Denial of Service Attack Analysis

A denial-of-service attack is generally relatively easy to detect because it is
usually related to a large number of NetFlow records. An unexpected burst of incoming
network traffic may indicate a denial-of-service attack on internal servers. Therefore,
the number of NetFlow records is a primary characteristic for identifying
denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore, attackers usually use very little or no payload for
attack in order to use network bandwidth to send more packets. Thus, a small request
payload is another important characteristic of a denial-of-service attack. In Figure 5.3,
the blue rectangular zone contains NetFlow records potentially related to
denial-of-service attacks for Big Marketing Network.
Because background color in the cell graphs represents the scale of the y-axis,
we should start with the darkest green to find the highest traffic rate. In the blue
rectangle in Figure 5.3, many of the cell graphs are the darkest green, indicating that
their NetFlow amounts are very large. The payloads are all under 100 bytes, but the
session durations vary from 0 to over 100 seconds.
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Figure 5.3 Duration-Payload overview with DOS attack zone

Because denial-of-service attacks usually come with a significant traffic burst to
one or many internal servers, we should focus on peaks from the overview. With the
help of a zoomed-in scatter plot, Figures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) display the NetFlow records
potentially related to denial-of-service attacks. Figure 5.4(a) highlights cell graphs with
the largest y-scale, and Figure 5.4(b) shows the corresponding records count per hour.
The colors for highlighting in Figure 5.4(a) correspond to the colors in Figure 5.4(b).
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Figure 5.4(a) Duration-Payload overview with nine cell graphs highlighted

Figure 5.4(b) Scatter plot with four potential DOS events highlighted

68
In Figure 5.4(b), there are four obvious peaks formed from points with different
colors, all marked with red rectangles. Potentially, these four events are
denial-of-service attacks because the flow count reaches 1 million per hour, which is
significantly larger than normal. Further study showed that the first two events are
indeed denial-of-service attacks, but the last two events were port scanning. In this case,
these two port-scan attacks involved an unusually large amount of traffic, and we will
cover this more in the port scan section.
After identifying the suspicious events, we can use host-flow view to further
investigate the first two denial-of-service attacks; Figure 5.5(a) displays a data point
from the first event on April 2. There are 10 external hosts (in the first coordinate) using
different ports to target port 80 of internal web server 172.30.0.4. In a sense, this is a
distributed denial-of-service attack because there are multiple external attackers.
Further investigation of other data points in the same region indicated that this attack
was targeting only one web server (172.30.0.4), indicating that there are over 10 million
records (sum of the data point amount in Figure 5.4[b]) associated with this web server
during 1 hour or so. We can use a user-defined host-flow view to investigate this
server’s behavior during the attack. In this step, we can remove attributes such as
source port, payload, and session duration and add a count coordinate to represent the
number of NetFlow records. This will help clarify the web server’s activity during the
attack period.
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Figure 5.5(a) Host-Flow view analysis for a data point

Figure 5.5(b) Host-Flow view analysis for activities of web server 172.30.0.4

Figure 5.5(b) depicts the activities of web server 172.30.0.4 on April 2 and
highlights the high-count NetFlow records. These highlighted records are related to the
denial-of-service attack. From the first coordinate, which represents external IPs, we can
see that there are a total of 10 external hosts involved and that the attack started at

70
approximately 5:20 a.m. and ended at 7:00 a.m. At approximately 7:02 a.m., there is a
10-minute gap with no records, marked by a red circle in the figure. This is possibly the
result of a denial-of-service attack that temporarily crashed the web server. After 7:15
a.m., the server was back to normal and the denial-of-service attack was over.
The analysis above shows that denial-of-service attacks are relatively easy to
detect primarily because of the large amount of traffic. A Duration-Payload overview
and scatter plot can be combined to identify the attacks, while a host-flow view
provides a clear timeline for the attack. Human analysts can identify the external
attacker, the internal victim, when the attack happened, and the consequences through
a multiple-level visualization.

5.3

Server Redirection Analysis

Compared to denial-of-service attacks, a server-redirection attack is usually more
difficult to detect. There are generally two phases in a server-redirection attack: hacking
and redirection. In the first phase, servers are hacked by external attackers through a
virus or malicious code injection. This is usually very difficult to discover based solely on
NetFlow data because the corresponding packets may have normal payload and
duration attributes. In the second phase, redirection, the primary characteristics are
unusually short session duration and small payload. It is difficult to define a “usual”
range clearly because the attributes vary for different hosts and servers. Moreover,
many complex websites are hosted on multiple servers, and many automatic
redirections are benign and should be distinguished from malicious ones.
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For normal web servers, session lengths should follow a relatively consistent
pattern. Session lengths vary, but there should be certain values that are distributed in a
range. When a server is hacked, however, the incoming traffic will usually be redirected
to another external malicious website after a short time.
Therefore, the average duration will decrease significantly, and the payload will
normally decrease because users do not send further requests (packets) to servers after
redirection.
This analysis suggests that each cell graph in the Duration-Payload overview
should have relatively consistent traffic. Variation is acceptable as long as it is within a
reasonable range; users’ visits may vary. If there is a significant traffic gap, or if there is
noticeable traffic some of the time but none at all at other times, it is reasonable to
assume that something happened to the servers.
It is possible that the servers are configured differently (such as to host other
websites) or have been hacked, but otherwise a server’s NetFlow data and behavior
cannot change significantly during two weeks or a short period of time. For example, in
Figure 5.6, the cell graph in the blue rectangle shows significant traffic in the first few
days but no sign of traffic afterwards.
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Figure 5.6 Duration-Payload Overview with a cell graph highlighted

The activities in blue rectangle of Figure 5.6 are suspicious because traffic
distribution for normal-running servers does not usually change all that much.
Inspecting the NetFlow records shows that it is all incoming traffic to web server
172.20.0.4. Because the overview allows us to check the Duration-Payload distribution
for a specific server, we can take a closer look at the NetFlow records for server
172.20.0.4, as seen in Figure 5.7(a) and Figure 5.7(b). It should be noticed that Figure 5.6
and Figure 5.7(a) are very similar, but 5.7(a) only visualized data for one server.
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Figure 5.7(a) Duration-Payload Overview for web server 172.20.0.4

Figure 5.7(b) Scatter plot for web server 172.20.0.4
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Web server 172.20.0.4 clearly exhibits a significant traffic shift from the blue and
orange rectangles to the green rectangle. Here we ignore the high peaks in the darker
green cell graphs because they usually indicate denial-of-service or port-scan attacks. To
clearly present the shift, we can put data from those three cell graphs into a
second-layer visualization, as seen in Figure 5.7(b).
It is easy to see that on April 3, incoming traffic undergoes a very suspicious
change: The session duration significantly decreases to 0 seconds, and incoming payload
decreases as well. What does a 0-second duration mean? We know that NetFlow
combines a series of packets between two hosts, and 0-second duration means that at
most a couple of packets are transferred between the hosts before the connection is
terminated. To further investigate the changing NetFlow records, Figures 5.8(a) and
5.8(b) shows NetFlow data; 5.8(a) is from a blue dot in 5.7(b), and 5.8(b) is from a green
dot in 5.7(b).

Figure 5.8(a) Host-Flow view for server 172.20.0.4 before redirection
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Figure 5.8(b) Host-Flow view for server 172.20.0.4 after redirection

As seen in Figures 5.8(a) and 5.8(b), source payload size (incoming traffic to
servers) of NetFlow decreases from 1,900 bytes to 190 bytes, and session duration
declines from 3 seconds to 0 seconds. The payload size decrease is significant, but the
session duration decrease is not so obvious because it is only 3 seconds. Such consistent
changes still call for careful investigation, however.
It is difficult to explain the shift if it is not the result of a server reconfiguration or
a redirection attack. We can see that the shift happened at around 10:00 a.m. on April 3,
but it is difficult to confirm when the server was infected with malware because
attackers can initiate the redirection any time after infection, and the NetFlow that
contains malware cannot be detected without the payload. Ground truth confirms that
the hacking phase cannot be seen from the NetFlow data.
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Figure 5.9 Duration-Payload Overview with one cell graph highlighted

From the analysis, we can see that server redirection can be identified by short
session duration and small payload, but a traffic pattern shift may not necessarily
indicate an attack. For example, in Figure 5.9, a cell graph is highlighted in a blue
rectangle because data are shown in the second week but that cell is completely blank
in the first week. Such a situation usually requires attention because it indicates the
server’s traffic pattern changed significantly during the 2 weeks. Further investigation
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reveals that three mail servers in Big Marketing Network are responsible for the pattern
shift. Our example is mail server 172.20.0.3, seen in Figure 5.10.

Figure 5.10 Duration-Payload overview and scatter plot for mail sever 172.20.0.3

In Figure 5.10, the small graph in the top left corner is the Duration-Payload
overview for mail server 172.20.0.3. Two cell graphs, highlighted in blue and orange,
clearly contain most of the normal traffic. We ignore other cell graphs with peaks here,
because we know those peaks are produced by denial-of-service or port-scan attacks. In
Figure 5.10, the blue points represent NetFlow records with a payload of less than 100
bytes, and the orange points represent NetFlow records with a payload of more than
1,000 bytes. Though the session duration for the two groups is the same, the payload

78
alteration is still relatively large. Nevertheless, there are two indications that this is not
an attack.
First, despite the blue and red points, their distribution patterns during a day are
very similar: high peaks in the morning that decline to a relatively consistent level. This
corresponds to people’s behavior. We check our e-mail when we start to work in the
morning. Because usually some e-mail was received the previous night, the number of
e-mails we need to send in the morning is relatively high. During the day, we frequently
check e-mail or send them to others, and overall the traffic to mail servers will be at a
consistent level.
Second, the changing point is on April 8 and April 9, when we know server
maintenance took place and Big Marketing Network was down. Therefore, it is very
possible that the administrators reconfigured the servers during that time, resulting in a
shift in traffic. Based on these two observations, it is highly possible this traffic shift for
mail server 172.20.0.3 is normal. Ground truth does not list any related attacks to this
server.

5.4

Data Exfiltration Analysis

In the Duration-Payload overview, a very suspicious zone for data exfiltration
attacks is the top right corner; those cell graphs show relatively long sessions and large
payloads. These two characteristics give us the main way to distinguish a data
exfiltration attack because real content of the payload is not available in NetFlow data.
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In data exfiltration, an attacker will generally steal the information through a
web or file transfer protocol (FTP) tunnel. Because NetFlow data are generated from a
series of packets between two machines, a data exfiltration attack will normally
generate a record with large payload and long session duration. If an attacker
transferred only minimal data, it would be almost impossible to detect using NetFlow
data because the data exfiltration record would be the same as that of other normal
records.

Figure 5.11(a) Duration-Payload Overview with two suspicious data exfiltration events
highlighted
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Figure 5.11(b) Second level visualization: enlarged time series for the two NetFlow

In Figure 5.11(a), two cell graphs with records are in the top right corner,
significantly away from the others. Their session lengths are in the ranges 10–99 and
100–999 seconds, and, notably, the payload sizes are both in the order of 108 bytes,
significantly larger than any other. Figure 5.11(b) confirms that there are only two
NetFlow records, occurred in Apr 6th and Apr 7th respectively.
The parallel coordinates in Figure 5.12(a) provide more detail. For these two
events, the attacker is external host IP 10.7.5.5 and the victim is web server 172.10.0.40.
The source ports for these two events are both 20, indicating they are using FTP. Port 21
on the external FTP server, which is used to establish the connection between two hosts.
The red circles mark the payload: One is about 100 million bytes, and the other is 600
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million bytes. The payload is actually from the external FTP server to the internal host,
but here we still consider the two events to be data exfiltration.

Figure 5.12(a) Host-Flow for the suspicious NetFlow record

Figure 5.12(b) Host-flow between FTP server and internal host

In Figure 5.12(a), we see that the second data exfiltration event (orange line)
uses only port 20, which is not supposed to be the case because port 21 is needed to
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establish the connection. We can use a host-flow view to investigate further by setting
10.7.5.5 as the source IP and 172.10.0.40 as the destination IP. With NetFlow records,
sometimes there is a mix-up between the source IP and the destination IP because the
traffic collector does not catch the first packet (this is why they are called firstSeenSrcIP
and firstSeenDestIP, and this is inevitable in NetFlow).
In Figure 5.12(b), NetFlow records related to port 21 are highlighted. On April 7,
there is a record from internal host 172.10.0.40 to the external FTP server; the
timestamp is marked in the red circle. This establishes the connection for the second
data exfiltration, which is missing in Figure 2.11. We have the whole picture here for the
two data exfiltration events.
April 11 is suspicious because the internal host seems to have been trying to
connect to the FTP server again (orange line in Figure 2.12), but there is no significant
payload this time (actually, it is zero payload). It is possible the attacker was trying to
pull off a third data exfiltration but failed somehow. From this example, we can see that
the host-flow view can be used to investigate any events of interest, providing the
timeline for analysis.

5.5

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we use the VA system to identify security events in 2 weeks of
VAST data. First, Duration-Payload overview and Host-Maxconn overview can be used to
highlight NetFlow traffic and hosts related to attacks. Zoomed-in timeline visualizations
provide more insight. Finally, Host-Flow views are capable of displaying very detailed
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information. The multiple-level VA system is able to not only discover security intrusions
but also provide timelines for these events for further investigation. We have
successfully identified denial of service, data exfiltration, server redirection, and port
scanning through the VA system. In the next chapter, the VA system will be evaluated
systematically, and results will be presented and discussed.
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CHAPTER 6.

SYSTEM EVALUATION

In the previous chapter, we described how the VA system can be used to detect
network intrusions and abnormalities in detail. Furthermore, the VA system can provide
situational awareness for the network by presenting and analyzing traffic patterns. To
prove that the VA system is capable of detecting attacks effectively, however, a
thorough evaluation is necessary.
In this chapter, we will present a systematic evaluation of the VA system. The
ground truth for the Big Marketing Network data will be the primary criteria for the
evaluation process, such as calculating false positives and false negatives in the VA
system. It should be noted, however, that the ground truth lists only network intrusions
but that the VA system can also highlight and identify abnormalities in the network that
are not necessarily related to attacks.
Because overview is the most important feature in the VA system, the evaluation
process will focus primarily on overviews. In other words, for the 2 weeks of data, we
are primarily interested in how the overviews can help detect intrusions and what
potential issues may arise.
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6.1

Background and Attack Traffic Analysis

When evaluating intrusion detection systems, we need to have more insight into
the size of normal and malicious network traffic. For example, if there are 100 NetFlow
records and 10 of them are malicious records, it is relatively easy to target the records
related to intrusions. When the traffic size increases to 10,000 records, however, finding
the corresponding 10 records is rather difficult. Therefore, background and attack traffic
analysis is presented here.
For data exfiltration, there are two intrusion records, and Table 6.1 displays the
background network statistics for when data exfiltration happened. Here we can see
that during the two data exfiltration events, the background traffic rate is rather high
compared to the attack traffic rate. Moreover, the durations are only 125 seconds and
63 seconds, which is not significantly long. The only notable characteristic is that the
data transfer size is very large compared to normal traffic.

Table 6.1 Background and attack traffic analysis for two data exfiltration events
Duration

Data Exfiltration

Background traffic

Attack traffic

Timestamp

(seconds)

size (MB)

rate (flow/s)

rate (flow/s)

4/6, 10:36

125

103

41.1

1.0

4/7, 7:00

63

596

79.2

1.0

86
Similarly, Table 6.2 provides scanning and background network traffic statistics
related to two port-scan attacks, and the first one is obvious and second one is subtle.
The “obvious” port scanning on April 6 has a very significant attack traffic rate, which is
270.18 flow/s. Comparing to background traffic rate, more than half of the traffic was
associated to the port scan event. Moreover, the duration is also very long (100
minutes). All of these factors make this port scanning relatively easily to be identified.
In contrast, the subtle only lasted 5 minutes and attack traffic rate was 0.60
flow/s. As a result, filtering out the background traffic to detect port scanning in such
cases is rather difficult and needs more effort.

Table 6.2 Background and attack traffic analysis for two port scanning intrusions
Timestamp

Duration

Number of

Background traffic

Attack traffic

(minutes)

Scanned hosts

rate (flow/s)

rate (flow/s)

4/6, 11:10

100

8

447.14

270.18

4/7, 7:00

5

6

20.75

0.60

Background and attack traffic analysis is not meaningful for denial-of-service
attacks, however. In typical denial-of-service attacks, the attack traffic rate is much
higher than the normal background traffic rate, making these attacks easily detectable
from network traffic.
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6.2

Metrics Evaluation

In the process of evaluating intrusion detection systems, true positives, true
negatives, false positives, and false negatives are the most fundamental metrics.
Because the ground truth lists all intrusions, we need to count the true positives that we
can identify from the overview. For the Duration-Payload overview, we focus primarily
on denial-of-service attacks and data exfiltration. Even though server redirection can be
identified in this case, there is only one server redirection attack. For the Host-MaxConn
overview, the main goal is to identify port-scan attacks.

Figure 6.1 Duration-Payload Overview with multiple suspicious zones
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In the Figure 6.1, we have highlighted the suspicious zones for different types of
intrusions, and our primary goal is to identify denial of service attack, server redirection,
and data exfiltration, although port scanning are also identified as we discussed in the
previous section. The suspicious zones with different colors and number labels are
discussed here:
1. Red Zone. The red zone identifies denial-of-service attacks. In the
Duration-payload overview, quite a few cell graphs have peaks in similar positions,
marked by the red rectangle. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are four
significant peaks; the first two are indeed denial-of-service attacks, and the last two are
port-scan attacks (these cannot be counted as false negatives because they are
intrusions). So for the category of denial of service, the two attacks are both successfully
identified, and there is no false negative or false positive.
2. Yellow Zone. The yellow zone identifies server redirections. Two cell graphs
are selected in this case because they both have significant but inconsistent traffic
records during the 2 weeks. Our investigation (discussed in Chapter 5) showed that the
left one is server redirection, but the right one is not. Further analysis indicated
reconfiguration on some servers, resulting in the traffic pattern shift in the right one,
but it is not a server redirection attack. For the category of server redirection, the
server-redirection attack is successfully identified, and there is one false positive.
3. Blue Zone. The blue zone identifies data exfiltration. The Duration-Payload
overview reveals two cell graphs that contain NetFlow records potentially related to
data exfiltration: They both have abnormally large payloads and are of relatively long
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duration. Our study showed that these two records are between one internal server and
one external FTP server, and ground truth confirms that these two events are data
exfiltration. For data exfiltration, all the related attacks have been identified, and there
are no false positives or false negatives.
4 and 5. Purple and Green Zones. These two zones are not specific for any type
of attack, but they contain some isolated peaks. The two peaks in the purple zones are
actually port-scan attacks, as seen in Figure 6.2, where a wide range of destination ports
of internal servers are scanned, from 80 to over 55,000. Because we do not evaluate
port-scan attacks in the Duration-Payload overview, we do not count these isolated
peaks either as true positives or as false positives.

Figure 6.2 NetFlow records from purple zone

From an analysis of the different zones in Figure 3.1, we get the four metrics for
the overview, as shown in Table 3.3, where TN is true negative, FP is false positive, FN is
false negative, and TP is true positive.
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Table 6.3 Standard metrics for Duration-Payload Overview evaluation
Predicted Label

Actual Class

Normal

Intrusion

Normal

21(TN)

2(FP)

Intrusion

0(FN)

12(TP)

From Table 6.3, we can see that there is even no false negatives, indicating all
the intrusions (denial of service, server redirection and data exfiltration) are identified
successfully. Next, we can calculate detection rate and false positive rate based on these
metrics.
Detection rate (DR) is defined as the ratio between the amount of correctly
identified attacks and the total amount of attacks, that is:
DR = TP/ (FN + TP) = 12/(0+12) = 1.0
False positive rate (FP) is defined as the ratio between the amount of normal
NetFlow that are mistakenly identified as intrusions and the total amount of normal
NetFlow, that is:
FP = FP/(TN + FP) = 2/(21+2) = 0.087
From the results of detection rate and false positive rate, we can see that all the
denial of service attacks and data exfiltration were successfully identified and the false
positive rate is only 0.087. Remember the null hypothesis for DoS attacks, FP <= 0.10 for
detecting denial of service attacks (significance level 0.05). Thus here we accept the null

91
hypothesizes for denial of service attacks and data exfiltration. In other words, based on
evaluation of VAST data set, Duration-Payload can effectively identify DoS attacks and
data exfiltration.
On the other hand, for the Host-MaxConn Overview, we effectively identified all
9 external port-scan attackers, including 7 obvious attackers and 2 subtle attackers
during the two weeks. There was only one external host, which was labeled as attacker
incorrectly. Moreover, there are quite a few external hosts with significant inbound
traffic, and they are possibly normal external servers. The data is summarized in Table
6.4.

Table 6.4 Standard metrics for Host-MaxConn Overview evaluation
Predicted Label

Actual Class

Normal

Intrusion

Normal

20(TN)

1(FP)

Intrusion

0(FN)

9(TP)

Similarly, in this case, detection rate is 1.0, and false positive rate is 0.048.
Remember the null hypothesis for port scan attacks, FP <= 0.10 for detecting port scan
attacks (significance level 0.05). Therefore, we accept the null hypothesizes for port scan
attacks. In other words, based on evaluation of VAST data set, Host-MaxConn is capable
of classifying port scan attacks.
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6.3

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we evaluate the two overviews systematically. A background and
attack traffic analysis reveals that subtle attacks are indeed difficult to detect from
massive network traffic. We investigate the two overviews, calculating detection rate,
false-positive rate, and specificity. Detection rate and specificity can reach over 0.9, and
the false-positive rate is below 0.1. Therefore, detection of the four types of attacks
(denial of service, server redirection, data exfiltration, and port scan) in VAST data sets is
successful.
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CHAPTER 7.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

7.1

Conclusions

In the previous chapters, we briefly stated reasons to apply visual analytics to
network security and intrusion detection. Related literature was presented and
discussed, indicating that many visual analytics systems do not provide an appropriate
overview to detect subtle intrusions effectively. Research methodology was presented
in Chapter 3, including research framework, system components, primary data sources,
and system evaluation criteria. In Chapter 4, the VA system was described in detail,
including two overviews (Duration-Payload and Host-MaxConn) and several zoomed-in
visualizations. The functions of these approaches were discussed by presenting how to
use them to highlight various characteristics of network intrusions. Therefore, our
approach is a characteristics-based VA approach. In Chapter 5, three primary attacks
types (denial of service, data exfiltration, and port scan) were discussed, showing how
to use the VA system to identify these attacks in the VAST data sets. Interestingly, server
redirection can also be identified from Duration-Payload overview. Finally, we evaluated
the VA approach systematically with the data set’s ground truth, showing that it is
capable of identifying intrusion events with very few false positives.
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Based on the VA system and evaluation results in the previous chapter, we can
draw the following conclusions:
(1) The Duration-Payload overview is capable of detecting denial of service and
data exfiltration effectively. For the VAST data sets, false positive rate is only
0.087, which is significantly less than our pre-defined criteria 0.10 with
significant level 0.05.
(2) The Host-MaxConn overview is capable of detecting port scanning effectively.
For the VAST data sets, false positive rate is only 0.048, which is significantly
less than our pre-defined criteria 0.10 with significant level 0.05.
(3) Duration-Payload overview can be used to detect server redirection based on
the patterns of network traffic.
(4) Zoomed-in visualizations can facilitate analyst investigations of security
events and provide situational awareness.
(5) Characteristic-based visual analytics approaches have been proven to be
effective and practical in detecting subtle attacks from network traffic data.
The approaches also provide some degree of scalability considering the size
of Big Marketing network.

7.2

Future Work

The visual analytics approach developed in this project has been proven capable
of identifying both obvious and subtle intrusions from massive network traffic. Future
work will focus on the following:
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(1) Evaluate the system with another data set and optimize the system
accordingly. Because we evaluated the VA system only with the VAST data
set, it would be better to test and evaluate the system with other data sets.
(2) Incorporate a more highly automated process into the VA system so that
identifying suspicious network traffic can be done more intelligently.
(3) Extend the system to detect other network intrusions, such as botnets,
malware infection and other application-layer attacks. Currently, the VA
system focuses only on three common types of network intrusion.
(4) Test the VA system in a real-world network to see how it behaves in a
practical scenario.
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